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CASE SUMMARIES
BANKRUPCIY
In re Ferco Fabricators, Inc., Husch &
Eppenberger, and Whitehead, 153
B.R. 40 (Bankr. E.D.Mo. 1993)- Robert J.
Whitehead (Whitehead) and William K. Free-
man(Freeman)werepresidentandvicepresi-
dent, respectively, of FERCO Fabricators,
Inc. (FERCO). FERCO, represented by Husch
& Eppenberger (Husch), filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection on November 11,
1990. Whitehead and Freeman were
awarded over $25,000 in administrative
expenses for their role in the bankruptcy
process.
Whitehead later pled guilty to one count of
bankruptcy crime and agreed to cooperate in
the prosecution of Freeman for environmen-
tal and bankruptcy crimes. As a result of the
new information concerning Whitehead's
and Freeman's criminal activities, Husch
filed a motion to reconsider their administra-
tive expenses award. The court found that
Husch was a party in interest as it had been
awarded attorney fees which had not yet
been paid and would be filing for additional
expenses as a result of this new information.
Rule 3008, Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, applies the same standards set
out in Rule 60, Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure (FRCP). These standards allow relief
from a judgment if based on a showing of
newly discovered evidence which could not
have been discovered under due diligence in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)
FRCP.
The court found that Husch had met this
standard as the indictments were not handed
down until after the award was granted.
Whitehead's and Freeman's failure to prop-
erly dispose of chemicals resulted in in-
creased expenses to FERCO in terms of
winding up costs and removal costs. There-
fore, the court barred Whitehead and Free-
man from sharing in remaining funds to
recover their administrative expenses.
- Tom Ray
CERCLA
Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City
Powerl & Light Co., 1993 WL 141122
(8th Cir. 1993)- A manufactured gas plant
contaminated certain property in Mason
Cty, Iowa with coal gas tars and tar residues
before it ceased operating in 1931. Kansas
City Power & Light Company (KCPL) pur-
chased the site in 1932, disassembled the
gas plant and sold the property to Interstate
Power Company (IPQ in 1957. In 1984,
blasting operations by third-party defendant
Bob McKinness (McKinness) disturbed the
coal gas contaminants, causing pollution of
a nearby creek. After investigation, the Iowa
Department of Natural Resources (IDNR)
allowed McKinness to continue blasting.
KCPL alleged that McKinness' operations
caused contaminated soil to be deposited on
theproperty. In addition, KCPLclaimed that
pond waterbecame contaminated and seeped
into bedrock fissures.
The EPA targeted the site for cleanup
under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA). IPC agreed to clean up and sued
Iowa-Ilinois Gas & Electric Company, as
successor to the gas plant utility, and KCPL
to recover clean-up costs. KCPL then initi-
ated third-party claims against McKinness
and Iowa-Illinois. McKinness filed fourth-
party claims against IDNR and Mason City
and requested summary judgment on KCPL's
claims, arguing that it was not a "potentially
responsible person" under CERCLA.
The district court granted McKinness' mo-
tion for summary judgment, finding that
McKinness was not liable under 42 U.S.C. §
9607 (a) (3) because it had not arranged for
disposal of hazardous substances. (Although
KCPL had also alleged McKinness was an
ownerand operatorunder42 U.S.C. § 9607
(a) (1) and (2), it did not raise these issues in
response to McKinness' motion for sum-
mary judgment) KCPL filed a motion to
reconsider under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 60 (b), which the court
denied. KCPL alternatively requested that
the summary judgment ruling be entered as
afinaljudgmentunder Rule 54 (b), which was
granted. KCPL then appealed both the
summary judgment and the denial of its
motion to reconsider. The appellate court
sought to determine whether the Rule 54 (b)
motion was effective. If not, the court would
lack jurisdiction.
Rule 54 (b) permits a district court to
"direct the entry of a final judgment as to one
or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination
that there is no just reason for delay." The
appellate court found the Rule 54 (b) deter-
mination by the district court to be inappro-
96
priate. It noted that the district court had
treated KCPL's motion to reconsider as a
Rule 60 (b) motion. It denied the motion
because Rule 60 (b) applies only to motions
for relief from final judgments. When the
motion to reconsider was decided, the sum-
mary judgment order was not considered
final. The court noted that under Rule 54(b),
a non-final order may be revised at any time
before the entry of judgment on all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties. Accordingly, thedistrict court should
have addressed KCPL's motion to recon-
sider on its merits. Because it failed to so do,
the appellate court deemed the Rule 54 (b)
finding to be inappropriate.
McKinness argued that KCPL failed to
respond to the motion for summary judg-
ment and consequently surrendered its claims
under § 9607. The appellate court rejected
this argument, stating that even if an oppos-
ing party failed to challenge the motion for
summary judgment, the district court must
still decide that the moving party would be
entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to
that claim.
The court additionally noted that an ap-
peal on a third-party claim was improper
until the primary dispute was decided. The
district court, therefore, abused its discretion
in making a Rule 54 (b) determination.
- Michelle Vokoun
Stewman v. Mid-South Wood Prods.
ofMena, Inc., 1993 WL 165308 (8th Cir.
1993) - The plaintiffs, neighbors of a previ-
ous Superfund cleanup site near Mena, Ar-
kansas, brought suit against the site owners,
engineering consultants, and the firm which
completed the actual cleanup for contamina-
tion of their property. The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs
had not established that a release of hazard-
ous substances into the environment had
occurred, thus nullifying their Comprehen-
sive Environmental, Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA) claim for
response costs.
The plaintiffs plead claims for damages for
the diminution in property value, common
law claims for negligence and trespass, and
also sought to recover CERCLA response
costs. The plaintiffs had taken samples of
dust and water on their land which indicated
levels of PCP, arsenic, chromium, and cop-
per in excess of a "natural amount." The
plaintiffs attempted to establish that these
hazardous substances had been released
from the former Superfund site asa result of
an unsuccessful cleanup and contamination
during the actual cleanup operation.
The EPA had issued an Interim Closeout
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Report in 1989 which found that all remedial
activities had been completed and required
monitoring of the Superfund site for 30
years. The state environmental agency's
water discharge permits for the area require
regularly testing for PCP, arsenic, and chro-
mium.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's finding that no release or threatened
release of the hazardous substances had
occurred from the Superfund site. After a
review of the trial court record, the appellate
court accepted the testimony of the
defendant's toxicologist that no release or
threatened release had occurred and that
chromium, copper, and arsenic are naturally
occurring substances in water and soil.
The court agreed with the holdings in
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, 889 F.2d 664
(5th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir.
1992) that there is no minimum quantitative
requirement to establish a release or threat-
ened release of hazardous substances under
CERCLA.
By concurring with the Fifth and Third
Circuit that there is no minimum quantitative
requirement to determine when a release has
occurred, the court stated that no rigid stan-
dard will be fixed for determining when the
quantity of a release is sufficient to establish
a CERCLA claim for response costs. Mean-
while, the court dismissed the plaintiffs as-
sertion that a release of hazardous sub-
stances had occurred at this site.
- Anthony P. Farrell
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Morrison Grain Co., Inc.,_ 1993 WL
266959 (10th Cr. 1993) -Morrison Grain
Company (Morrison Grain) and Cropland
Chemical Company created Agro Marketing
Company (Agro) as a joint venture to handle,
sell, buy and store agricultural chemicals. In
1983, the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (U.S. EPA) found hazardous
substances in large quantities inadequately
stored in disintegrating containers at Agro's
facility in Latham, Illinois. Morrison Grain
entered into a partial consent decre'ewith the
EPA to pay $120,368 of the total $231,024
the EPA incurred in response costs under
CERCLA.
In 1985, Morrison Grain notified the U.S.
EPA and the Illinois Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (Illinois EPA) of leaking chemi-
cals at a facility in Meredosia, Illinois. The
U.S. EPA and the Illinois
Morrison Grain to clean up the
expense. Morrison complied
$214,000.
Morrison Grain filed claims
ers to recover its response cos
eral liability policies then in
insurer denied coverage citing
language. This language exclu
of damage resulting from the
pollutants onto the land. Exem
exclusion is damage from "sud
dental" discharges.
The Tenth Circuit Court o
firmed the district court in hol
term "accidental" was defined
unexpectedly from a subjectiv
"Sudden" is given an objective
of swiftness. The court followe
which the court held governed
that contracts are to be read as
meaning given to each term. T
rejected the argument that the
den and accidental" should be
unit and therefore given one m
would reduce "sudden" to sur
the releases occurred over tim
not sudden and were therefo
from coverage under the term
aes.
Cook et al. v. Rockwell I
147 F.R.D. 237 (D. Colo. 1993
from the Rocky Flats weapon
facility grand jury investigation
States District Court for Colora
a group of plaintiffs were no
discovery of the grand jury mat
the court held that the plaintiffs
certification for toxic tort litiga
Dow Chemical and Rockwell
were entitled to further discove
release of Comprehensive Er
Response, Compensation, and
(CERCLA) hazardous substanc
tiffs may not simply "piggyba
grand jury investigation, but mu
the requested materials were re
civil claims.
In reviewing various discover
U.S. Magistrate and motions
under Federal Rules of Procedur
the court held that the plaintiffs
with further discovery of docu
are relevant to their claims. T
raised both common lawand CEE
and sought damages fora decrea
EPA ordered value of their property, CERCLA response
site at its own costs, and bodily injury from radioactive and
at a cost of hazardous substances released from Rocky
Flats, which was operated by Rockwell Inter-
with its insur- national.
ts under gen- The court held that: 1) the plaintiffs can
effect. Each obtain the computerized indices to the Envi-
the policies' ronmental Master File with respect to the site
ded coverage to determine whether there were relevant
discharge of documents not presently in their possession;
pted from the 2) plaintiffs are entitled to an extension of
den and acci- time in which to submit expert reports on
dose estimation due to practical aspects of
f Appeals af- the testing; 3) plaintiffs have sufficiently es-
ding that the tablished a CERCLA claim for a threatened
as happening release of hazardous substance without a
e viewpoint. showing of existing contamination of bodies
nterpretation or properties, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4);
d Kansas law, and 4) plaintiffs are entitled to additional
the policies, discovery of environmental records gener-
a whole and ated by Rockwell at Rocky Flats without a
hus the court showing of the necessity for such docu-
phrase "sud- ments, as the plaintiffs lacked the computer-
read as one ized indices for the voluminous documents.
eaning which The court found that there was no viola-
plusage. As tion of Rules 11 or 37 as it was public
e, they were knowledge at the time of thefiling the second
re excluded amended complaint that Rocky Flats had
of the pol- been closed after an FBI and EPA raid of the
facility due to safety concerns about the
- Tom Ray handling of hazardous substances, and a
grand jury had been empaneled to investi-
nt'l Corp., gate environmental crimes at Rocky Flats
- In fallout after the raid.
production This decision will allow the plaintiffs' ac-
,the United tion to proceed as plaintiffs have shown that
do held that they have a Rule 11 basis for their CERCLA
t entitled to claim, and have shown practical difficulties in
erials. While processing and presenting current discov-
seeking class ery. Thecourtreluctantlyalowed expansion
ition against of the discovery requests under the Federal
International Rules, which eventually may include materi-
ry regarding als subpoenaed by the grand jury to the
ivironmental extent the plaintiffs can show that these
Liability Act materials are relevant to their claims for
es, the plain- reasons independent of the fact that they
ck" on the were considered by the grand jury.
Tt show that - Anthony P. Farrell
levant to the








United States v. Smuggler-Durant
Mining Corp., 1993 WL 198814 (D. Colo.
1993) -Smuggler-Durant's mining opera-
tions on Smuggler Mountain in the 1800's
and 1900's resulted in mining dumps, mill
tailings and other waste being deposited
throughout a 110 acre site located in Pitkin
County, Colorado. The U.S. alleged that
lead and cadmium, both hazardous sub-
-EP97
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stances, existed in high concentration
throughout the site. Portions of the site have
been developed for residential use although
the Smuggler Mountain mine is still in opera-
tion.
The U.S. also alleged that Pitkin County
acquired a portion of the site, known as
Mollie Gibson Park, in 1983. In addition, the
U.S. alleged that Centennial-Aspen disposed
of the hazardous soil from the park and that
the County removed the dumps and tailings
containing the hazardous substances and
used it as foundation for roads, both on and
off the site.
The U.S. brought this action to recover
response costs incurred as a result of the
release and threatened release of hazardous
substances at the site. This case decided the
U.S.' motion to strike certain affirmative
defenses raised by the County,
The court summarily struck the county's
defenses that the U.S. had failed to state a
claim for relief and that the claims were
frivolous and groundless. The complaint
alleged a release or threatened release of
hazardous substances atthe site which caused
the U.S. to incur response costs, that the
County presently owned part of the site, and
that the County owned part of the site at the
time of the disposal of the hazardous sub-
stances. This was held to state a claim under
§ 107(a) of CERCLA (42 U.S.C. 9607(A)).
The County also raised the defense of lack
of jurisdiction. This defense was also quickly
stricken as the County conceded jurisdiction
in its response to the U.S.' motion.
The County raised the equitable defenses
of laches and statutes of limitations, the
doctrine of unclean hands, the failure to
mitigate damages, estoppel, waiver, consent
and release, and equity as well as the de-
fenses of failure to join an indispensable
party and that the claim was barred because
any releases were de minimis. Again, the
court quicidy struck these defense, because
§ 107(b) provides an exclusive list of de-
fenses which does not include any of the
above.
The court upheld the County's defenses
that the releases of the hazardous substances
were caused solelybyan actof Godorbyacts
or omissions by third parties over whom the
County had no control. The court ruled that
these defenses presented mixed questions of
law and fact and were not subject to a motion
to strike.
The County also raised the defense that
the costs incurred were unnecessary and
inconsistent with the national
plan (NCP). The defense furthe
a declaratory judgment action
cause it cannot be determined
future costs are necessary an
with the NCP. It also stated that
failed to provide an accounting
costs. The court recognized a
the costs were not consistent w
but struck all other defenses.
further stated the allegations th
unreasonable or not cost-effe
constitute a defense under CER
The County defense that it is
response costs because the remi
adopted provides that the pro
by the County will be used as a d
contaminated soil from proper
which is owned by persons ot]
county and therefore executior
will exacerbate any hazardou
that are present. The court stat
not understand this defense a
parties should provide further b
issue.
The court struck three defe
with the appropriateness of join
liability because the U.S. was
joint and several liability.
The County also raised the d
the remediation plan will result i
taking of the County's property
County is entitled to set-off for t
the U.S. which will damage t
property. The court held that t
allowable defenses under CERC
such a claim for recoupment sho
form of a counterclaim of an
action.
Finally, the County sought to
the affirmative defenses raised
defendants. The court held t
requires a defendant to set foit
mative defense in its answer
County wants to raise addition
defenses, it must seek leave to
ant to Rule 15. Therefore, this
also stricken.
Dresher, Inc., v. BNY O
Corp., 1993 WL 195341 (N.
- In 1987, Dresher, Inc. (Dres
Hanis-Hub Company (Harris-
frame and furniture manufactur
to a written stock purchase
whereby Dresher was to pur
Harris-Hub's stock. At the tim
contingency the shareholders included defendants BNY
r stated that One Capital Corporation (as apparent suc-
s barred be- cessor to Irving Capital Corporation) (BNY),
whether any First Small Business Investment Company of
d consistent California (FSB), Roger Harris, Joan Pikas;
the U.S. had Penny Block, and Arthur W. Brown, Jr.
of response Included in the agreement was a clause
defense that providing that indemnification would be the
ith the NCP exclusive remedy of the parties for "any and
The court all breaches of representation, warranty or
at costs are agreement contained" therein.
tive do not After purchasing Harris-Hub, Dresher
CI.A. hired environmental consultants to investi-
not liable for gate company plant sites. The investigations
ediation plan revealed that, due to the release of hazardous
perty owned materials and illegally maintained storage
epositoy for tanks, extensive removal of contaminated
ty at the site soil and toxic materials was necessary.
her than the Dresher incurred more than $1.5 milion in
of the plan expenses from the ensuing cleanup and
s conditions expects additional costs from future removal.
ed that it did Because of these costs, Dresherfiled three
rid that the separate counts against defendants. Defen-
iefing on the dants in Count I include BNY, FSB, Al Harris
and Bruce Pikas as "owners" or "operators"
nses dealing of the plant as defined by the Comprehen-
t and several sive Environmental Response, Compensa-
not seeking tion and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.§§ 9601 et seq. Dresher claimed that
efenses that CERCLA provisions required the removal of
nan unlawful the soil and materials because of the "re-
and that the lease" or "threatened release" of hazardous
he actions of substances. It also alleged that it was entitled
he County's to recover its expenses under CERCLA for
hese are not the removal performed and any required in
LA and that the future. In Counts 11 and IIl, Dresher
uld be in the alleged against defendants BNY, FSB, Roger
independent Harris, Joan Pikas, Stock, and Brown, as
trustee, breach of warranties regarding envi-
incorporate ronmental matters in the purchase agree-
by all other ment.
iat Rule 8(c) Section 107(a) of CERCLA authorizes
h each affir- private entities to recover costs from respon-
and if the sible parties incurred in cleaning up hazard-
al affirmative ouswastedisposalsites. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
do so pursu- BNY and FSB asserted that, because of the
defense was indemnification clause in thepurchase agree-
ment, Dresher failed in Count I to state a
- Tom Ray claim on which relief could be granted. They
also claimed, with the other defendants, that
ne Capital Counts Hand III lacked supplemental subject
D. I. 1993) matterjurisdictionrequiredbyafederalcour
ier) acquired The court dismissed Count I against BNY
Hub), a bed and FSB, holding that state law will gover
er, pursuant claims against them because the parties'
agreement agreement expressly provided "a bar to a
chase all of CERCLA claim in favor of an exclusive
e of the sale remedy through indemnification (under ansB -
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nois law] for breach of a seller's warranty." It
stated that it had "previously permitted par-
ties to contract privately for the distribution
of CERCLA liability among themselves" in
Village of Fox River Grove v. Grayhill,
Inc., 806 F.Supp. 785, 792 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
It reasoned that the indemnification clause
enforces CERCLA's liability provisions for
hazardous waste polluters. However, be-
cause defendants Al Harris and Bruce Pikas
answered the complaint, the court retained
jurisdiction over them and was thus required
to resolve subject matter jurisdiction ques-
tions regarding defendants in Counts II and
III brought by Dresher under state law. The
court held that it retained jurisdiction over
the Second and Third Counts under "supple-
mental" jurisdiction. It noted that under 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a), federal courts havesupple-
mental jurisdiction over state law claims
where they form part of the same "case or
controversy" as the federal claims. The court
focused on the fact that, although different
legal elements composed the lattertwo claims,
proof of them would intertwine with the proof
required for Count I.
- Dan Coughlin
Emergency Tecnical Servs. Corp. of
II. v. Morton Int', Inc., 1993WL210531
(N.D.Ill. 1993) -Plaintiff, Emergency Tech-
nical Services Corporation of Illinois (ETSC)
specializes in disposal of hazardous wastes.
ETSC sought a declaratory judgment that it
was not liable to defendants Radiac Research
Corporation (Radiac), SAFT America, Inc.
(SAFT) and Morton International, Inc.
(Morton) under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA). The defendants filed
counterclaims against ETSC under CERCLA
for cleanup costs of Groce Labs, a hazardous
waste site.
Defendant SAFT manufactures battery
systems, which create a hazardous by-prod-
uct SAFT approached Irwin Kraut, vice
president of ETSC to find a site to dispose of
the by-product. Mr. Kraut located Groce
Labs in Greer, South Carolina, to dispose of
the waste.
Defendant Radiac is in the business of
waste disposal. Radiac contacted ETSC for
help in finding a site to dispose of hazardous
wastes produced by Radiac's clients. ETSC
suggested Groce Labs.
Defendant Morton also contacted ETSC
for help in finding a waste disposal site.
ETSC again recommended Groce Labs to
handle the waste disposal.
Each of the defendants' transactions with
Groce Labs were conducted through ETSC.
ETSC assessed each defendant's waste dis-
posal needs, considering the nature of the
waste. It issued price quotations for the
disposal, facilitated transportation of the
waste, arranged shipping dates and provided
instructions on packaging the waste, among
other services. ETSC received a 30 to 35
percent markup on the amount Groce Labs
would receive for the disposal. The defen-
dants paid ETSC, which in turn paid Groce
Labs for the services rendered.
Because ETSC arranged for the disposal,
the defendants claimed that it should be
jointly and severally liable with the defen-
dants for cleanup under CERCLA. The
court addressed whether ETSC was a "re-
sponsible person" under § 107(a)(1) - (4), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). The court determined
that no genuine issue of material fact existed
and that the defendants were entitled to
judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
CERCLA provides that "arrangers" con-
stitute responsible persons. "Arrangers"
include "any person who by contract, agree-
ment, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of haz-
ardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazard-
ous substances." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
The court stated that arranger liability should
be broadly construed to meet CERCLA's
remedial goals.
The court examined whether a "nexus"
existed between ETSC and the disposal of
the hazardous waste. The court stated that
such nexus could be found where a party
took affirmative action which resulted in
disposal at a site which ultimately released
the hazardous substance. A nexus could also
exist where the party controlled the handling
and disposal of the waste and, by failing to
act, determined the disposition of the waste.
The court found that a nexus existed in that
ETSC was actively involved in the timing,
manner and location of the disposal. The
court also noted that as long as the party was
somewhat involved, even if not actively, it
could still find the nexus. Consequently, the
court determined that ETSC was liable as a
person who "otherwise arranged" for dis-
posal.
The court rejected ETSC's defense that
the defendants made their own decisions to
dispose of their wastes at Groce Labs. Ar-
ranger liability, it explained, does not attach
onlyto thosewho make theultimatedecision
to dispose of their wastes at a particular site.
- Michelle Vokoun
Dico, Inc. v. Diamond, 821 F.Supp. 562
(S.D. Iowa 1993) - In September 1983, a
Des Moines trichloroethylene (TCE) site was
placed on the National Priorities List. On
July 21, 1986, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) issued an Administrative
Order under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and I-
ability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a)
to Dico, Inc. (Dico) to clean up hazardous
substances at the TCE site. Two months
later, Dico submitted to the EPA a list of
requirements in the Order that it believed
were not appropriate or could hinder the
implementation of the cleanup.
In October 1986, Congress enacted the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986 (SARA). SARA created in
CERCLA a cause of action for reimburse-
ment of cleanup costs to a non-liable party
who received and complied with an Admin-
istrative Order. To petition for reimburse-
ment underSARA, the petitioner must prove
by a preponderance of evidence that it is not
liable for costs under § 9607(a) and that such
costs are reasonable. If the EPA refuses to
grant the reimbursement, the petitioner may
file an action. The EPA agreed to some of
Dico's suggested changes between late Oc-
tober and late November. In July 1988, Dico
petitioned the EPA for reimbursement of
costs it incurred in carrying out the Order
which totalled $764,134.08 plus future costs.
In May 1992, the EPA issued a final
judgment denying Dico's petition based on
the fact that the reimbursement provision did
not apply to Dico as its Order was issued
prior to enactment of SARA. Under the
provisions of SARA, Dico filed an action in
July 1992 against the EPA seeking reim-
bursement of stated costs. This claim was
premised on CERCLA and the Due Process
and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.
The issue before the court was whether
the CERCLA reimbursement provision ap-
plies only to parties who both receive and/or
comply with an Administrative Order after
the effective date of SARA. The court
agreed with the EPA that its interpretation of
the reimbursement provision is consistent
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with SARA's statutory language, its history
and purpose and with the general principle
of narrowly interpreting waivers of sovereign
immunity.
Dico argued that it complied with a Modi-
fied Order issued after enactment of SARA
but the EPA contended that it did not agree
to all of Dico's suggested changes and that
whatever modifications were made, the origi-
nal Order of July 21 required Dico to clean
up theTCE groundwater contamination site.
The court agreed that the Modified Order did
not change Dico's obligation to comply with
the Order or the EPA's right to enforce it.
The court rejected the EPA's argument
that it did not have jurisdiction over Dico's
claims under the Due Process and Takings
Clauses, but granted the EPA's motion to
dismiss thosetwo counts. The courtordered
Dico's claims for reimbursement under
CERCLA dismissed with prejudice and its
claims under the Due Process and Takings
Clauses dismissed without prejudice.
- Christine Hymes
United States v. Arrowhead Ref. Co.,
et al., 1993 WL 170966 (D. Minn. 1993)
- The United States District Court for Min-
nesota granted a motion for summary judg-
ment for Chrysler Corporation which was
impleaded for response and remedial costs
under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA) as a generator of hazardous sub-
stances. The court held that Chrysler was
not liable for the arrangements for the dis-
posal of contaminated waste oil by one of its
dealers which was identified as a potentially
responsible party at the Arrowhead Refining
Company (Arrowhead) oil recycling plant.
Arrowhead had operated an oil recycling
plant at which waste oil was processed and
distilled to remove impurities. The hazard-
ous product of the refining process was
deposited in a swampy area adjacent to the
plant. The refinery had accepted waste oil
from various sources, including Plaza Dodge,
a Chrysler dealership.
The Environmental Protection Agency
sought to recover response and remedial
costs under CERCLA from Arrowhead as
operator of the facility. Arrowhead brought
a third-party action against Plaza Dodge for
liability as a generator of the hazardous
substances. Plaza Dodge then sued Chrysler
for liability as an independent generator of
the hazardous substances.
Chrysler first attempted to rely on an
agreement of denial of an agency relation-
ship between itself and Plaza Dodge which
the court viewed as similar to a "hold harm-
less" agreement. The court held that while
the parties are free to characterize their
relationship in any way they choose, this
agreement will not serve to absolve Chrysler
from CERCLA liability.
The court found that the relationship be-
tween Chrysler and Plaza Dodge lacked the
crucial nexus to hold the parent corporation
liable for the ads of its subsidiary. While
Chrysler had directed many of the marketing
and sales aspects of Plaza Dodge, Chrysler
had not controlled or influenced the dealer's
choice regarding disposal of waste oil. The
court also found no duty of Chrysler in
CERCLA or otherwise to ensure that its
dealer had properly disposed of its waste oil.
The court neglected to pierce the corpo-
rate veil of Chrysler by finding that the degree
of control and actual participation or involve-
ment by Chrysler in the dealer's affairs had
only been akin to that of a creditor-debtor.
Thus the court granted Chrysler's motion for
summary judgment, finding Chrysler not




Mueller, et al. v. United States Envt'l
ProtectionAgency, Atlas Envt'l Servs.
Inc., 1993 WL 171848 (8th Cir. 1993) -
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
the petitioners' petition for review of a final
order denying review of the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) approval of a
permit for a storage/feed handling facility
adjacent to a planned hazardous waste incin-
erator. The court dismissed the petitioners'
four arguments in their petition for review as
being insufficient for a hearing, holding that
the EPA had considered all of the relevant
factors, its decision contains no clear error,
and the petitioner had waived many of their
arguments before reaching the court
Atlas Environmental Services, Inc. had
applied for a joint permit from the EPA and
the Missouri Department of Natural Re-
sources (DNR) to build and operate a hazard-
ous waste incinerator and related structures
under the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6992K The EPA issued its portion of the
permit for a storage/feed handling building,
where limited quantities of waste would be
stored and prepared for incineration.
The four petitioners filed a petition for
review with the EPA's Environmental Ap-
peals Board, which denied their request for
review without a hearing. The Regional
Administrator issued a final permit decision,
and the petitioners then filed a petition for
review in the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
The petitioner argued that: 1) the EPA
permit inappropriately incorporates provi-
sions of the Missouri permit, the Missouri
permit is not binding on the incinerator's
landowner, and the EPA's incorporation
refers to incorrect sections of the Missouri
permit; 2) there was not sufficient geological
and hydrological information as: (a) Atlas
had submitted only preliminary studies, (b)
there was no evidence that the storage/feed
handling building will comply with federal
performance standards, (c) the environmen-
tal report contains inapplicable information
and is not a detailed "geological assess-
ment," and (d) there is no evidence that
construction design details or specifications
have been submitted to the EPA; 3) the EPA
could not sufficiently evaluate the quality of
existing ground waters based on the infor-
mation it had; and 4) the permit application
itself identifies risk to human health.
The court found that the petitioners had
waived their first argument by failing to raise
the issue during the comment period or
before the Environmental Appeals Board
(pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 129.19(a),(e)) and
because the EPA's incorporation of the in-
correct sections of the Missouri permit was a
harmless typographical error. On the sec-
ond argument, the court again found that the
petitioners had waived the contention that
Atlas had not submitted construction design
details or specifications by failing to raise the
issue during the comment period or before
the Environmental Appeals Board. With
respect to the contention that Atlas only
submitted preliminary studies to the EPA,
the court reviewed the evidence submitted
and found that the EPA considered the
relevant factors and thus its decision was not
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
The court also found that the EPA had
considered the relevant factors in the third
argument as the EPA had reviewed ample
ground water quality information. The court
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also rejected petitioners' fourth argument
because the Missouri portion of the permit
addresses the safety of the incinerator's op-
eration, and because the EPA permit con-
tains requirements to insure that the explo-
sives are handled safely.
In a footnote, the court noted that the
Missouri DNR's portion of the permit is now
on appeal in the Missouri courts.
- Anthony P. Farrell
Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie
Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian
Community, 991 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1993)
- The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act (Act), 49 U.S.C. app. A, § 1811, pre-
empted a tribal nuclear radiation control
ordinance which required transporters to
obtain a tribal license, and that a preliminary
injunction to prevent enforcement of the
ordinance was appropriate.
The Sioux Indian Community in Minne-
sota had enacted an ordinance which re-
quired transporters to obtain a tribal license
for each shipment of nuclear materials across
reservation land. Northern States Power
Company (NSP) brought a declaratory judg-
ment action for a ruling that the tribal ordi-
nance is preempted by the Hazardous Mate-
rials Transportation Act. The district court
granted the preliminary injunction requested
by NSP against application of the Prairie
Island Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Commu-
nity ordinance until resolution of the declara-
tory judgment action.
NSP operates its Prairie Island nuclear
plant near the Prairie Island Indian Commu-
nity Reservation, where the only current
ground access for NSP's seventy shipments
of nuclear materials per year to or from the
plant is by a railroad or a county road, both
of which cross the reservation. The
Mdewakanton Tribal Council ordinance
required that transporters obtain a separate
tribal license for each shipment of nuclear
material, and that license applications must
be filed 180 days in advance of the shipment
and be accompanied by an application fee of
$1,000. The ordinance also gave the Tribal
Council the authority to determine whether
toissuealicense, andto imposea $1,000,000
civil fine for willful violations of the ordi-
nance.
The court of appeals held that the Hazard-
ous Materials Transportation Act preempted
the tribal ordinance regulating transporta-
tion of nuclear materials over the Indian
reservation. Relying on congressional in-
tent, as demonstrated by language indicating
that the act preempt local regulations which
are an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the goals of the Act, andSouth-
ern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 909 F.2d 352, 358-9 (9th Cir.
1990), the court found the district court did
not err in denying the tribe's motion to
dismiss. Noting that in Southern Pac. and
in ColoradoPub. Util. Com m'n v. Harmon,
951 F.2d 1571, 1582-3 (10th Cir. 1991),
the Ninth and Tenth Circuits had held that
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
preempted less stringent regulations than
those of the Mdewakanton Tribal Commu-
nity, the court concluded that the tribe's
notice and licensing requirements for nuclear
materials were also preempted by the Act.
ThecourtfurtherfoundthattheActwaived
the tribe's sovereign immunity from compli-
ancesuits under 49 U.S.C. app. A, § 181 1(a)-
(d), and that the district court correctly ap-
plied the four-factor test from Dataphase
Sys., Inc. v. C-L-S Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109,
113 (8th Cir. 1981) when it issued the
preliminary injunction. In considering the
grant of the preliminary injunction by the
district court, the court of appeals found that
the issuance of the injunction was proper
because the tribal ordinance is preempted by
the Hazardous Materials Transportation and
is not a legitimate exercise of the tribe's
sovereign powers.
- Anthony P. Farrell
Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas
Dep't of Pollution Control, 992 F.2d
145(8th Cir. 1993)-TheArkansas Depart-
ment of Pollution Control (Department)
sought to incinerate thousands of drums
containing dioxin-contaminated hazardous
waste. The Arkansas Peace Center (Peace
Center), asserting that the incineration was
in violation of federal and state regulations,
received a temporary restraining order (TRO)
from the district court. The Department then
filed an interlocutory appeal and a motion for
stay pending appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292 (b). The Eighth Circuit granted the stay
pending appeal of the TRO.
The district court subsequently granted a
preliminary injunction in favor of the Peace
Center. The Eighth Circuit then granted a
temporary stay of the preliminary injunction,
leaving the issue of whether the Eighth Cir-
cult should grant the Department's motion
for stay pending appeal of the grant of the
preliminary injunction.
The Department as the party seeking the
stay, was required to show: 1) it was likely to
succeed on the merits; 2) it would have
suffered irreparable injury without the stay;
3) no substantial harm would come to other
interested parties; and 4) the stay would not
harm the public interest.Hilton u. Braunskill,
107 S.Ct. 2113, 2119 (1987). The court felt
these burdens were met as the Department
was likely to succeed on the issues of subject
matter jurisdiction; the Department would
suffer irreparable harm by not being allowed
to fulfill its public duty in cleaning up the
hazardous waste; other parties would not
suffer substantial harm; and the stay pro-
tected the public interest by destroying thou-
sands of environmentally threatening drums.
The court specially acknowledged its con-
cem over the general threat from incinera-
tion but noted the presence of continuous
monitoring by the Department and a detailed
risk assessment which gave no cause for
alarm.
-Tom Ray
Williams v. Monsanto Co., 1993 WL
189554 (Mo.App. 1993) - The Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held
that the plaintiff, Robert Williams, Sr., failed
to show that he was entitled to a verdict as a
matter of law on his nuisance claim, and also
had not shown substantial damage to his
property to overcome a directed verdict ona
trespass claim against defendant Monsanto
Company. The plaintiff claimed that a
Monsanto chemical plant abutting his auto-
mobile repair business emitted particulate of
sodium tripolyphoshate (STP) that caused
pitting of the paint on customers' cars and
the subsequent closing of his business.
On appeal, the court reviewed the evi-
dence presented by plaintiff and defendant
to the trial court and the jury and found that
the trial court ruled correctly in directing a
verdict on the trespass claim and in denying
plaintiff's motion for judgment not with-
standing the jury's verdict for the defendant
on the nuisance claim. On the trespass
claim, the court held that plaintiffs evidence
had not dealt with the damage which the
STP did to the property itself, and thus
plaintiff had not shown an actual interfer-
ence with the possession of the land as
required by Missouri law on trespass involv-
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ing pollutants. While plaintiff was allowed by
the trial court to reach the jury on his nui-
sance claim, the jury found for the defendant
on that issue.
The court's decision clearly differentiates
the evidence and elements needed to prove
nuisance and trespass claims involving pol-
lutants. Citing Maryland Heights Leasing,
Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, 706 S.W. 2d 218 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985), the court states, "for tres-
pass to lie the pollution must be at a level so
as to constitute an actual interference with
the possession of the land, not merely inter-
ference with its use and enjoyment." The
court then stated "nuisance requires that one
unreasonably use his property such that it
substantially impairs the rights of another to
peacefully use his property," citingRacine v.
Glendale Shooting Club, Inc., 755 S.W. 2d
369 (Mo.App. 1986). Here the court found
that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient
evidence to establish either trespass or nui-
sance.
While the plaintiff had claimed that the
STP had caused pitting of customers' cars,
other evidence presented showed Monsanto
had attempted to diagnose and correct the
STP problem, no other neighbors had com-
plained about STP fall-out, and plaintiffs'
business was apparently alosing proposition
before any complained of emissions oc-
curred.
- Anthony P. Farrell
Patz v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins.
Co., 817 F.Supp. 781 (E.D.Wis. 1993) -
Patz Sales, Inc. (Patz) disposed of its indus-
trial waste by placing portions of it in a
seepage pit and burying other portions in
barrels. Both of these sites were located on
the company's premises.
The Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources determined that groundwater be-
neath the Patz's property was contaminated
and ordered the removal of the seepage pit,
removal of thebarrels, and future groundwa-
ter monitoring. Patz contacted its insurer,
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Com-
pany (St Paul) to seek payment. St. Paul
refused as the insurance agreement with
Patz was for liability purposes only and
specifically excluded damages to property
owned by or under the control of Patz.
The dispute was tried in the U.S. district
court since the action was between parties of
different states and the amount in question
exceeded $50,000. Following Erie v.
Tompkins, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938
substantive law was applied.
The court held that St. Paul
to pay for the cost of removing
pitandbarrelssincethecontamin
water was the public's, not Pat
under Wisconsin statute. Th
cited a 1992 Wisconsin Court
decision which held that own
exclusions do not apply where
risk is not to the property of th
to third-parties' property, incl
property.
The court further held that, a
policy, immediate remediatior
taken before contamination ca
other private property. Thus,
dictates that in order to preve
environmental harm, owned-i
clusions should not be allowe








enforcement. The court recognized that
citizens who live near hazardous waste facili-




ed-property Beatty v. The Metro. St. Louis Sewer
the primary Dist., 1993 WL 199155 (Mo.App. E.D.) -
einsured but The Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer District
uding public (MSD) was created by St. Louis voters in
1954 to consolidate the management of the
s a matter of various sewer systems in St. Louis City and
should be St Louis County. The MSD was given the
n spread to power to raise operating revenue through
public policy direct property taxes and by levying service
nt additional fees.
property ex- In 1980, the voters of Missouri amended
'd to hinder article X, § 22 of the Missouri Constitution(the Hancock Amendment) to prohibit is-
- Tom Ray ing taxes or fees without a majority vote in
the affected county or other political subdivi-
Sierra Club v. Chemical Handling
Corp., 1993WL214131 (D.Colo.)-Plain-
tiffSierra Club (Sierra) sueddefendantChemi-
cal Handling Corporation (CHS) for injunc-
tive and declaratory relief and civil penalties
under the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et
seq. Sierra claimed that CHS stored hazard-
ous waste at its Broomfield, Colorado facility
without a permit in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
6925(a).
The court had previously granted CHS
summary judgment on the claim, having
found that Colorado law superseded the
claims. Sierra then filed motions to amend
its complaint to allege violations of the Colo-
rado hazardous waste program and to recon-
sider the summary judgment.
The Colorado statute, Coto. REv. STAT.
25-15-308(1)(b) and 6 C.C.R. 1007-3, Part
100, lacks a citizen suit provision. The
question before the court, therefore, was
whether RCRA's citizen suit provision could
apply to state statutes and regulations.
Under RCRA, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) may authorize states to
administer hazardous waste regulatory pro-
grams that are consistent with the federal
program "in lieu" of RCRA regulations. The
court found that because RCRA authorized
Colorado's program, Sierra could bring a
RCRA citizen suit.
The court's decision was based in part
upon the importance of citizen suits to RCRA
sion.
The MSD submitted a proposed fee in-
crease to the voters of St. Louis County and
St. Louis City. The proposal was defeated.
The MSD then, after public hearings, pro-
mulgated two new ordinances reducing the
capital improvement surcharge by four dol-
lars and increasing the wastewater charge by
four dollars. The total amount of sewer fees
remained unchanged.
Plaintiffs filed suit arguing that increasing
the wastewater charge without receiving a
majorityvoteatthepollsviolatedtheHancock
Amendment.
The court applied the five point test estab-
lished in Kelly v. Marion County Ambu-
lance Dist., 820 S.W.2d 301 (Mo. banc
1991) to determine if the contested fees
were subject to the Hancock Amendment.
Together, the following points of this test
show whether a fee is actually a user fee or
is really a tax labeled as a fee.
The first point is: When is the fee paid?
Taxes are usually paid periodically regardless
of services rendered while user fees are
collected immediately before or after the
service is provided. The MSD fees are
collected from the vast majority of customers
quarterly or monthly, regardless of the ser-
vice provided. The MSD fee therefore more
closely resembles a tax than a user fee.
The second point is: Who pays the fee? A
tax is usually applied to almost all of the
residents of a political subdivision while a
user fee is charged only to those who actually
102 I M E LPR
Case Summaries
benefit from the service provide
fee is charged to almost all of th
St. Louis County and St. Lot
receive running water, and there
to a tax than a user fee.
The third point is: Is the amo
charged affected by the amoun
provided to the resident? The
based on the average sewage d
each type of living unit (i.e. sin
multi-family homes). The MS
like a tax as it is applied reg
resident's sewage output.
The fourth point is: Is the
providing a service? The cour
governments always provide a s
assessing a fee or a tax. The cc
the more critical question is: Is t
which the fee is assessed ma
universal or optional and singula
fee is mandatory for all residen
MSD, and therefore is a tax, nc
The fifth point is: Has the ac
cally and exclusively been pro
govemment? Sewerservices ha
provided by both government
private organizations. Within S
the government has always prc
service. Therefore, the servic
provided historically and exclu
govemment in St. Louis City.
Considering all of these poin
found that the MSD fee is closer
a user fee. Consequently, the
subject to the Hancock Amen
cordingly, the court ordered t
ordinances be vacated as vi
Hancock Amendment and orde
be submitted to the people for a
as possible.
WATER
Heins Implement Co., et
souri Hwy. and Transp. C
al., 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. 19
Highway and Transportation
(HTC) condemned land belongi
Implement Company (Heins) to
way bypass. HTC had a culvert
underneath the bypass to ac
normal rainfall, but it proved
equate for this purpose. As a res
occurred on Heins' land destrc
ment and crops. Heins brought
HTC, the general contractor, th
and the owner of an adjacent lak
d. The MSD court sustained -TC's motion for judgment
e residents of notwithstanding the verdict on Heis' claim
is City who for inverse condemnation, and granted sum-
foreis closer mary judgement for the claims agais the
other defendants and for the negligence and
unt of the fee nuisance claims against HTC. Upon transfer
t of services by the Missouri Court of Appeals, the Mis-
MSD fee is souriSupremeCourt reversedand remanded
ischarge for the trial court's judgment for lTC on Heis'
gle family or claim, but affirmed the other judgments.
) fee then is The Supreme Court found that the Coi-
fardless of a mon Enemy Doctrine, which lTC relied on
and which states that landowners are able to
government do whatever necessary to protect their prop-
t noted that erty from common enemies, was no longer
ervice when appicableinsituationsinvolvngsurfacewater
iurt held that runoff. The Court reasoned that this doc-
he service for tine did not give adequate guidance on what
ndatory and a landowners duty of care would be when
r? The MSD taking action to divert surface waters. In its
ts within the place, the Court held that a rule of reason-
t a user fee. ableness would better promote optimum
tivity histori- land use while ensuring equal distribution of
vided by the costs attributed to competing interests in
ye long been land use. This rule states that while a land-
al units and owner is entitled to any reasonable use of his
t. Louis City, land, this landowner will be liable if the
vided sewer impact to others arising from his interference
e has been with surface water results from intentional
sively by the and unreasonable acts, or if the landowner's
acts are negligent, recless, or in the course
ts, the court of an abnormally dangerous activity.
to a tax than After adopting the rule of reasonableness,
MSD fee is the Court found that the only proper claim
dment. Ac- against an entity with the power of eminent
hat the two domain is for inverse condemnation and not
olating the negligence or nuisance. The Court further
red that they found that the flooding caused by HTC's
vote as soon failure to install an adequate culvert was
sufficient to reverse the trial court's judgment
- Tom Ray notwithstanding the verdict. HTC argued
that res judicata barred Heins' cause of
action, but the Court found that HTC had
waived this defense. Even though Heins
al. v. Mis- received compensation at the original con-
omm'n, et demnation proceedings, this did not pre-
93) - The clude any recovery for the unanticipated
Commission flooding.
ng to Heins Because Hes filed a motion for a new
build a high- trial or for a redetermination of the damage
constructed award before the trial court granted HTC's
commodate motion for judgment notwithstanding the
to be inad- verdict, the Court further reversed the trial
ult, flooding court's denial of Hems' motion for a new
yng equip- trial. In addition, the Court affirmed the trial
suit against court's grant of summary judgment as to all
e engineer, other claims against the defendants.
te. The trial - Alyse Hakami
United States v. Idaho ex rel. Direc-
tor, Id. Dept. of WaterResources, 113
S.Ct. 1893 (1993) - In US. v. Idaho, the
United States Supreme Court held that be-
cause the McCarran Amendment [43 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)] does not contain a specific waiver
of the United States' sovereign immunity,
the United States is not obligated to pay an
estimated $10 million filing fee in a state
water rights adjudication. The Court stated
that a specific waiver of sovereign immunity
is required before the United States may be
held liable for these types of fees.
Under the McCarran Amendment, Idaho
commenced a comprehensive water rights
adjudication for the Snake River Basin. Idaho
requires the payment of filing fees for each
notice of claim before the notice can be
accepted by the Director of the Department
of Water Resources. Idaho Code § 42-1414
(1990). The United States claimed it-was not
obligated to pay the filing fee because the
McCarran Amendment did not waive its
sovereign immunity. After an adverse deci-
sion from the Idaho Supreme Court on the
sovereign immunity issue, the United States
petitioned for a writ of certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court.
In reversing the Idaho Supreme Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the qualifica-
tion in the McCarran Amendment that "no
judgment for costs" shall be entered against
the United States, did not contain a specific
waiver of the United States' sovereign immu-
nity with respect to the filing fees. While
recognizing that the terms "fees" and "costs"
normally have different meanings, the Court
held that Idaho legislation often blurred the
line between the two terms, such that "fees"
under the Idaho legislation could be encom-
passed within the meaning of "costs" from
which the United States would be immune
under the McCarran Amendment.
The Supreme Court stated that waivers of
federal sovereign immunity must be "un-
equivocally expressed" in the statutory text.
While rejecting both parties' construction of
the McCarran Amendment, the Court found
that the McCarran Amendment did not ex-
plicitly waive the sovereign immunity of the
United States for this type of filing fee.
- Anthony P. Farrell
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